

**01385**

**1963/02/20**

1667

SECRET

20 February 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Undersecretary of State Ball's Testimony Before  
The Select Committee on Export Control House  
of Representatives Committee

1. The statement relating to the Soviet military build-up in Mr. Ball's testimony before the Select Committee on Export Control House of Representatives Committee on 3 October is substantially the same as the memorandum read to Mr. McCone by Mr. Hillsman on 19 February.
2. There was one statement in the House testimony, however, which was not included in the memorandum read to Mr. McCone. In his statement to the Committee, Mr. Ball began with a statement: "Quite clearly, it (the Soviet military build-up in Cuba) does not constitute a threat to the United States."
3. There were also two statements in the memorandum read to Mr. McCone which were not included in the testimony: "If the SAM sites are to be operated solely by Cuban personnel, six months to a year of training will be required. There is a considerable amount of other new equipment which has not been precisely identified but is believed to include a large quantity of electronic gear."
4. In the question period during the hearing before the Committee, Mr. Ball made several statements which, in effect, added to the content of his testimony on 3 October.
5. During the testimony of Mr. McCone before the Mahon Committee on 5 February, Mr. Ball stated in response to a question during his 3 October testimony that, "These ships

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

REVIEWED BY

DATE 5/9/68

SECRET

( ) RELEASE

( ) DECLASSIFY

( ) EXCISE

( ) DECLASSIFY in PART

( ) DENY

( ) Non-responsive info

FOI, EO or PA exemption

TS authority to:

( ) CLASSIFY as

OADB

( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S cr ( ) C OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

X RELEASE

( ) EXCISE

( ) DENY

( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

DECLASSIFY

( ) DECLASSIFY

IN PART

MR Cases Only:

EO Citations

( ) CLASSIFY as

( ) S cr ( ) C OADR

( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S cr ( ) C OADR

IS/EPC/CDR(WU) Date: 6-17-82

for concern

SECRET  
BIA5  
B5

94

~~SECRET~~

are kept under the closest surveillance and we have a system of anti-submarine patrols which I think is quite effective.

Subsequently in his testimony, Mr. Ball was asked by Mr. Lipscomb: "Have you any indication of what the cargo was on these ships? (He was referring to US ships lent to the USSR under Lend-Lease). Mr. Ball replied: - "We may have. I don't have it here. We usually know in quite specific terms what cargoes have been carried by Soviet ships, those directly under Soviet operation." Mr. Lipscomb queried: "Mostly arms and ammunition?" to which Mr. Ball replied: "Mostly arms and ammunition, and also technical personnel, military technical personnel, and economic technical personnel as well." (Comment: Low-level photos were being taken of all ships coming towards Cuba. In any event, you can't see what is below decks. However, we now know that the missiles arrived in large-hatch ships and all equipment was below decks, and that the ships were hurriedly unloaded during nighttime. Movement of the missiles to sites was also accomplished during the darkness.)

6. Other replies by Mr. Ball to questions on 3 October included his statement: "Our information with regard to the availability of armament in Cuba, including the shipments which have been received in the recent build-up is, we believe, quite complete. Our intelligence is very good and very hard. All the indications are that this equipment which is basically of a defensive nature, and that it does not offer any offensive capabilities to Cuba against the United States or the other nations of the hemisphere."

7. Mr. Ball subsequently stated that "In the first place our intelligence with respect to Cuba is very hard and very good and very comprehensive, as a result of the number of refugees constantly coming out, and other kinds of opportunities that are provided to gain information with regard to the Cuban situation." (Comment: Very hard is not the terminology that we would have applied to the intelligence available on Cuba in early October, or indeed even today. This statement of Mr. Ball's does go beyond the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

statement which was read to you by Mr. Hillsman. The statement said "There is a considerable amount of other new equipment which has not been precisely identified but it is believed to include a large quantity of electronic gear.")

8. Later, Mr. Ball stated: "I have attempted to give a summary here of the situation based on our intelligence estimates which the intelligence community has made with regard to this." (Comment: There was no formal intelligence community document on inventories of Soviet military equipment in Cuba at the time of Mr. Ball's presentation.")

9. In response to a request for clarification on his position with respect to whether or not there were strategic missile sites in Cuba, Mr. Ball stated "Up to this point we have no evidence that there are any surface-to-surface missile installations in Cuba capable of firing to a greater range (greater than the 25 to 30 nautical miles of the coastal defense missiles.)" (Comment: Mr. Ford raised the question during your testimony concerning Mr. Ball's statement of "no evidence" after you had mentioned the reports of September 21, 22 and 23. You informed the Committee that because of these reports CIA became concerned and "started a program of targeting four flights and insisting on flights in order to give us the kind of information that we developed." You added that, "Hence, we could not report from what we had on September 21st, 22nd or 23rd that there actually were missiles there. We could say, 'Listen, we have to find out in an indisputable and irrefutable way that they are there because this gives us an indication there is a high probability.'")

~~SECRET~~